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Abstract
The Minority Game is a generic model of competing adaptive agents, which is often
believed to be a model of financial markets. We discuss to which extend this is
a reasonable statement, and present minimal modifications that make this model
reproduce stylized facts. The resulting model shows that without speculators, prices
follow random walks, and that stylized facts disappear if enough speculators take
into account their market impact.
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1 Introduction
The Minority Game [1] was introduced a few years ago as a physicists’ simpli-
fication of the famous Arthur’s El Farol’s Bar problem [2]. Since then it has
attracted much attention from the econophysics community [3]. The MG was
not initially thought as a model of financial market, but rather as a generic
model of competing adaptive agents in economy. Nevertheless, a majority of
papers on the MG are motivated by study of financial markets. It is therefore
worth investigating why and to which extend this is justified.
In this game N agents have to select one choice between two at each time
step, and those who are in minority are rewarded. They do not act randomly,
but rather inductively. This is achieved by giving to all agents their own set
of S strategies, or theories of the world, which predict a winning action for
all P possible states of the words. The agents are inductive in the sense that
they assign a score to each of their strategies which reflect their perceived
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performance and use a given time the one with the highest score. The strate-
gies’ sets of all agents are fixed before the beginning of the game, hence, play
the role a quenched disorder. If agents have no memory (P = 1), there is
no frustration in the physical sense, and an exact solution is straightforward
[4]. If P > 1, frustration arises because agents cannot optimize their behavior
simultaneously for all states of the world. In that case, the spin glass nature
of the MG is is revealed by a fruitful mathematical formalism [5–7]; spin-glass
techniques yield solve the model [6–9].
The minority mechanism has three fundamental consequences:
(1) Competition for limited resources: not all agents can win at the same
time 1 .
(2) There is no good behavior: a behavior is good only with respect to others’
behavior
(3) A good behavior may become bad when others’ behavior changes.
Agents’ inductive behavior complete the definition of the game:
(4) Adaptive agents try to predict next winning choice, which is determined
only by their own choices.
2 MG and financial markets
In a metaphorical way, this sounds like a financial market 2 . At this point,
there are however several characteristics that the MG does not share with
financial markets.
2.1 Producers
The first problem is that the MG is a negative sum game, hence, it is unclear
why speculators would be willing to play such games. Indeed, in the basic MG,
agents are forced to play at each time step; one expects that no agent would
remain after some while in the game if they were allowed not to play. This
amounts to ask why speculators are interested in real markets.
The money does not come from the speculators themselves; this suggests that
1 Note that competition only causes a psychological frustration, but no physical
frustration: the latter is due to the memory of agents, as stated above.
2 The question why financial markets can be modeled by a minority mechanism is
discussed in ref [10].
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there are other types of agents, in particuler agents called producers in ref
[11] who are not interested in making money inside markets, but who use the
market for exchanging goods. They introduce some predictable patterns in
the market which speculators exploit for their own profit. The producers are
much less adaptive than the speculators; in the MG context, this is reflected
by giving significantly less strategies to the producers than to the speculators;
as in ref [8], we consider Np producers (non-adaptive
3 agents) and Ns spec-
ulators (standard inductive agents). The resulting model already allows one
for studying the interplay between the information content H left by produc-
ers’ behavior, and the gain of the speculators. In addition, it is also exactly
solvable by spin-glass techniques.
2.2 A realistic grand canonical mechanism
Now that agents have a good reason to enter into the market, they still need
a criterion which should tell them when to enter and when to withdraw. Let
us review carefully agents’ behavior. For an agent of the basic MG, being
inductive means comparing the performance of all her strategies and noth-
ing more. In other words, only the relative strategies’ value is considered by
agents, whereas actual value of scores does not matter; consequently, an agent
is not worried by her real gain 4 . But having a positive or negative real gain
is of great relevance in reality. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider the
following grand canonical mechanism: at a given time, an agent plays if she
has at least one strategy with a positive score 5 [12,8,13]. However, this mech-
anism is problematic for two reasons. First, if there are no producers, hence no
incentive for the speculators to play, one ends with about 75% of speculators
in the market if Ns is large enough
6 . A more subtle but even more important,
problem is the fact that an agent who enters into market at time t and with-
draw from it at time t+∆t is sure to suffer a loss of at least U(t)−U(t+∆t)
where U(t + ∆t) < 0; indeed, the increase of score — a possible gain — be-
tween t− 1 and t is virtual, since the agent is not in the market, whereas the
loss is real (see figure 1).
Consequently, there is a need of another grand canonical mechanism 7 . The
3 i.e. with one strategy only.
4 This makes sense as long as she is forced to play.
5 Mathematically, if Umaxi (t) be the score of her best strategy: the criterion is simply
play if Umaxi (t) > 0.
6 Except if N < Nc = P/αc [14].
7 The mechanism we proposed in [15] is essentially similar to the one of ref [16];
however, in our version, the scores are kept since the beginning of the game, not only
during a small past time-window. The latter assumption is probably more realistic,
but is not needed for our purpose.
3
U(t)
εt
t
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of the proposed grand canonical mechanism. U(t) is
the score of the best strategy of the considered agent.
idea is to give a benchmark to agents such that they only stay in the market if
they perform well in the market and not only outside from it; as a consequence,
the more time they can spend in the market, the more successful they are. The
benchmark we propose is simply that an agent only plays if she has at least one
strategy with a score higher than ǫt/P (t/P is the system size’s independent
time; see [7]). Note that it is clear from figure 1 that the benchmark will make
agents withdraw quicker from the market.
The ǫ parameter consists of two parts. The first one is a “common sense” factor
C, which remedies the sure loss problem of the ǫ = 0 case; the second one can
be interpreted as the interest rate I of a risk-free account, hence ǫ = C+I, that
is, even if the interest rate is zero, one still has to consider ǫ > 0. Strikingly,
as soon as ǫ > 0, there is a phase transition of first order for ns = Ns/P > n
∗
s
and the average number of speculators inside the market is proportional to
the amount of information left by the producers 8 . In addition, in this region,
a whole set of stylized facts [18] arises: clustered volatility, power-law tails of
returns’ and volume’s distribution can be obtained. Note also that this region
is marginally efficient if ǫ > 0; when the number of speculators increases,
the market becomes more efficient. Since producers’ contribution to the price
dynamics is binomial, the price follows a random walk without the speculators,
and if there are enough speculators, stylized facts arises 9 .
Therefore, the combination of the presence of producers and the proposed
grand canonical mechanism not only answer to the questions of why and how
should speculators participate to markets, but also reproduces some markets’
characteristics. Most importantly in a MG context, this combination is still
exactly solvable [19].
8 Note that here ns = Ns/P = 1/α, where α is the usual control parameter [17].
9 The above behavior crucially depends on the price-taking behavior of a large
fraction of the speculators. If there are enough speculators who account for their
impact, all stylized facts disappears.
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Fig. 2. Predictability per agent H/(Np +Ns) (lines) and average number of active
speculators nacts (symbols) as a function of ns = Ns/P for Np = P and some values
of ǫ and P . For ns > n
∗
s, n
act
s has a discontinuous behavior as ǫ → 0. In addition,
as soon as ǫ, nacts does not depend on ǫ and tends to a constant value for ns →∞
2.3 Evolving capital – re-investment
This extension has been considered in [16,20,21]. Even if evolving capitals are
not needed in order to reproduce stylized facts in MG-like models, it has a
particular economic relevance, so that it makes sense to complete the above
models with this feature. In this case, the presence of producers is needed,
else all speculators are ruined after some while; even if agents are forced to
play, near the critical point stylized facts also arise; the resulting model is also
exactly solvable [21], although much more difficult to tackle analytically.
3 Conclusions
Very minimal modifications are need in order to obtain stylized facts in MG-
like models. What we believe to be the minimal modification to the standard
MG is the combination of producers and speculators playing or not according
to their benchmark. A more realistic and still exactly solvable model of markets
is a MG with producers, benchmark and evolving capitals, but the latter are
not needed in order to produce stylized facts.
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